What was plan dalet

Oneworld Publications, Rutgers University Press, Palestine Studies 18 1 , , p. Windsor, Ontario, Canada. December 2, Retrieved July 2, He said they should prepare for a long struggle to achieve Arab aims.

Israel: the first decade of independence. SUNY Press. Retrieved 20 April Immigrants in turmoil: mass immigration to Israel and its repercussions in the s and after. Syracuse University Press.

O Jerusalem! Simon and Schuster. Revisited', p. Retrieved 13 July Another paragraph detailed the method for taking over an Arab village: Surround the village and search it for weapons.

In case of resistance — annihilate the armed force and expel the population beyond the border If there is no resistance, a garrison should be stationed in the village. The garrison commander should expropriate all weapons, radio receivers and vehicles.

All political suspects should be arrested. After consulting the appropriate political authorities, appoint local institutions for administering the village internal affairs. The text clarified unequivocally that expulsion concerned only those villages that would fight against the Hagana and resist occupation, and not all Arab hamlets.

Similar guidelines related to the occupation of Arab neighborhoods in mixed towns. In his article written in , Khalidi and those who followed in his footsteps presented the guideline instructing the Hagana units to expel the Arab villagers as the principal issue of Plan D. Furthermore, they have distorted its meaning by portraying it as a general order embracing all Arabs in all villages.

The text, however, is clear enough: reading Plan D as it is, without deconstructing it to change its meaning, show that there is no correlation between the actual text, and the significance, background and outcomes that the Palestinian scholars and their Israeli colleagues assign it.

These paragraphs of Plan D were of marginal significance, and their contribution to shaping a policy towards the Arab population was immaterial. Ber, Pasternak and even Yadin did not pretend to be authorities on Arab affairs or any other issues of high policy.

Yale University Press. In fact, they had set in motion a strategic transformation of Haganah policy. Nahshon heralded a shift from the defensive to the offensive and marked the beginning of the implementation of tochnit dalet Plan D —without Ben-Gurion or the HGS ever taking an in principle decision to embark on its implementation. Indeed, the various battalion and brigade commanders in the first half of April, and perhaps even later, seemed unaware that they were implementing Plan D.

In retrospect it is clear that the Haganah offensives of April and early May were piecemeal implementations of Plan D. But at the time, the dispersed units felt they were simply embarking on unconcerted operations geared to putting out fires in each locality and to meeting particular local challenges the siege of Jerusalem, the cutoff of the Galilee Panhandle from the Jezreel Valley, and so on.

Plan D called for securing the areas earmarked by the United Nations for Jewish statehood and several concentrations of Jewish population outside those areas West Jerusalem and Western Galilee. The roads between the core Jewish areas and the border areas where the invading Arab armies were expected to attack were to be secured.

Plan D was geared to an invasion by regular Arab armies. Additional forces must be assigned to carry out these duties, as will be detailed below. These specifications also apply to isolated regions. The tactical plans concerning barricades must be adapted to and coordinated with the defensive plans concerning the zones located near these barricades. They must also be coordinated with the regional defense plans if this is possible from the geographical point of view.

The following operations must be carried out if the fixed defensive system is to be effective and if the rear of this system is to be protected:. Control of government installations and provision of services in each and every region. Mounting operations against enemy population centers located inside or near our defensive system in order to prevent them from being used as bases by an active armed force.

These operations can be divided into the following categories:. Destruction of villages setting fire to, blowing up, and planting mines in the debris , especially those population centers which are difficult to control continuously. Mounting search and control operations according to the following guidelines: encirclement of the village and conducting a search7 inside it.

In the event of resistance, the. The villages which are emptied in the manner described above must be included in the fixed defensive system and must be fortified as necessary.

In the absence of resistance, garrison troops will enter the village and take up positions in it or in locations which enable complete tactical control. The officer in command of the unit will confiscate all weapons, wireless devices, and motor vehicles in the village. In addition, he will detain all politically suspect individuals. After consultation with the [Jewish] political authorities, bodies will be appointed consisting of people from the village to administer the internal affairs of the village.

In every region, a [Jewish] person will be appointed to be responsible for arranging the political and administrative affairs of all [Arab] villages and population centers which are occupied within that region. Positions will be taken in the large cities according to the following principles:. Occupation and control of government facilities and property post offices, telephone exchanges, railroad stations, police stations, harbors, etc. Occupation and control of all isolated Arab neighborhoods located between our municipal center and the Arab municipal center, especially those neighborhoods which control the city's exit and entry roads.

These neighborhoods will be controlled according to the guidelines set for searching villages. In case of resistance, the population will be expelled to the area of the Arab municipal center. Encirclement of the central Arab municipal area and its isolation from external transportation routes, as well as the termination of its vital services water, electricity, fuel, etc. Occupation and control of locations which overlook main regional transportation arteries, such as police stations, water pumps, etc.

These elevated locations will be transformed into fortified surveillance posts to be used, when the need arises, as bases for a mobile defensive force. In many cases, this operation will be coordinated with the occupation of police stations, which aims at consolidating the fixed defensive system. Occupation and control of Arab villages which constitute a serious obstruction on any of the main transportation arteries.

Operations against these villages will be carried out according to the specifications given under the item pertaining to the searching of villages. By isolating them from transportation arteries by laying mines, blowing up bridges, and a system of fixed ambushes. If necessary, by occupying high points which overlook transportation arteries leading to enemy cities, and the fortification of our units in these positions. By disrupting vital services, such as electricity, water, and fuel, or by using economic resources available to us.

By launching a naval operation against the cities that can receive supplies by sea, in order to destroy the vessels carrying the provisions, as well as by carrying out acts of sabotage against harbor facilities.

Generally, the aim of this plan is not an operation of occupation outside the borders of the Hebrew state. However, concerning enemy bases lying directly close to the borders which may be used as springboards for infiltration into the territory of the state, these must be temporarily occupied and searched for hostiles according to the above guidelines, and they must then be incorporated into our defensive system until operations cease. Bases located in enemy territory which are intended to be temporarily occupied and controlled will be listed among the operational targets for the various brigades.

Counterattacks will be used as ancillary measures for the fixed defensive system in order to abort the organized attacks launched by semi-regular and regular enemy forces, whether from bases inside the country or from outside the borders. Diversionary attacks; i.

Striking at transportation and supply routes deep inside enemy territory, especially against a regular enemy force which is invading from across the border.

Attacking enemy bases in his rear, both inside the country [Palestine] and across its borders. Counterattacks will generally proceed as follows: a force the size of a battalion, on average, will carry out a deep infiltration and will launch concentrated attacks against population centers and enemy bases with the aim of destroying them along with the enemy force positioned there;.

The following duties are the responsibility of the Garrison Force [KHIM],9 defense of the zones and of isolated and fortified posts and formation of the regional reserves. Operations to block enemy transportation routes. For this purpose, every blocking operation will be assigned, on the basis of its importance and type, a specified Field Force unit whose size is appropriate to the nature of the mission. In addition, the Field Force brigade in question will be responsible for duties related to consolidating the fixed defensive system, as outlined in section 3 b.

In special and exceptional circumstances, Field Force units may be positioned in the regions or zones, or in isolated and fortified positions, in order to reinforce zonal or regional defense.

Efforts must be made to decrease the number of such cases, as far as possible. In addition to the duties detailed above, the Field Force's responsibilities within the fixed defensive system generally consist in mounting local counterattacks involving units no smaller than company larger units should be used if possible against enemy units while they are attacking the fixed defensive system in order to block their lines of retreat and destroy them.

These counterattacks will usually be launched from fixed operational bases which will be specified for the Field Force in the context of the duties for which it is responsible in the region as a whole. There is no other solution. The operational military orders specified which Palestinian population centers should be targeted and laid out in detail a blueprint for their forcible depopulation and destruction.

It called for: Mounting operations against enemy population centers located inside or near our defensive system in order to prevent them from being used as bases by an active armed force. These operations can be divided into the following categories: Destruction of villages setting fire to, blowing up, and planting mines in the debris , especially those population centers which are difficult to control continuously Mounting search and control operations according to the following guidelines: encirclement of the village and conducting a search inside it.

The Haganah soon to be Israeli army launched military operations under Plan Dalet at the beginning of April Although attacks by Zionist forces against Palestinian population centers actually began a few days after the UN Partition Plan was passed on November 29, , with the adoption of Plan Dalet expulsions accelerated and became systematic, marking a new phase in the conflict in which Zionist and then Israeli forces went on "the offensive," in the words of Israeli historian Benny Morris.

Following Israel's establishment on May 14, , the new Israeli government set up an unofficial body, the "Transfer Committee," to oversee the destruction of Palestinian towns and villages or their repopulation with Jews, and to prevent displaced Palestinians from returning to their homes.

In a report presented to Ben-Gurion in June , the three-man committee, which included the JNF's Weitz, called for the "destruction of villages as much as possible during military operations. By , at least , Palestinians had been made refugees, losing their land, homes and other belongings in what became known as the "Nakba" "catastrophe". Their flight was accelerated by massacres such as the one that took place on April 9, , at Deir Yassin near Jerusalem, where approximately Palestinian men, women, and children were murdered by Zionist paramilitaries.